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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
vs. i 
HEATHER JO RODRIGUEZ, 
JDefendant/Respondent. 
Case No. 20040566-SC 
SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
I * * * 
ARGUMENT 
Pursuant to this Court's Order, the State submits this supplemental brief in 
reply to the new matters raised in respondent's supplemental brief. 
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL POINT I 
THIS COURT SHOULD CONSIDER THE SUPPLEMENTAL ISSUE 
Defendant asks this Court not to review the supplemental issue because "the 
State did not ask this Court to consider the issue in its petition for a writ of 
certiorari." Supp. Br. Resp't at 1-2. He argues that this Court's review is limited to 
the issues raised in the petition for certiorari. Id. at 2. 
The supplemental issue is fairly included in the question presented in the 
State's petition. See Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4) (deeming question presented to 
comprise all subsidiary issues fairly included therein). The State's Question 
Presented noted that most jurisdictions have held that dissipating blood alcohol 
evidence is an exigency. Pet. Cert, at 1. It then asked, "Did the court of appeals err 
in adopting a novel and more restrictive approach/' Id. Thus, the question was not 
limited to determining whether dissipating blood alcohol evidence alone is an 
exigency. It sought review generally of the correctness of the court of appeals 
exigency analysis. Whether the court of appeals correctly analyzed the exigency 
fairly includes the subsidiary question of whether the court correctly considered the 
totality of the circumstances. Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4). 
This Court's order granting certiorari limited the issue for review to 
"[w]hether the dissipation of alcohol in the blood, without more, created an exigent 
circumstance justifying the warrantless extraction of a blood sample from 
respondent." Order dated October 19,2004. Nothing prohibits the Court from now 
in effect amending its order to grant the entire petition. 
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL POINT II 
A. DEFENDANT'S HINDSIGHT ANALYSIS OF TOTALITY OF THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES IS INCORRECT 
Defendant argues that this Court should look closely at the time available to 
the officers to obtain a warrant once the officers determined that probable cause and 
exigent circumstances existed. Supp. Br. Resp't at 5. She asserts the exigency here 
did not justify a warrantless blood draw because "two officers had the time and 
means to seek a warrant: Officer Larsen. . . and Officer Swensen." Supp. Br. Resp't 
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at 9. Defendant's argument incorrectly examines the facts in hindsight rather than 
from the perspective of the officers at the time they decided to draw her blood. 
The reasonableness of a search under the Fourth Amendment has always 
been determined by viewing the facts objectively from the perspective of the officers 
in the field performing the search. See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128,137 (1978) 
("[A]lmost without exception in evaluating alleged violations of the Fourth 
Amendment the Court has first undertaken an objective assessment of an officer's 
actions in light of the facts and circumstances then known to him."); Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1,22 (1968) (articulating Fourth Amendment inquiry as whether "the facts 
available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search warrant a man of 
reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate" (citations and 
quotations omitted)). 
The reviewing court must place itself in the shoes of the officers and 
determine whether, from their perspective and from the facts known to them, the 
search was reasonable. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 22. Reasonableness thus depends on 
the objective facts available to the officer at the scene, not those developed later by 
counsel. Or, as the Seventh Circuit has stated, reasonableness "depends not on the 
facts as an omniscient observer would perceive them but on the facts as they would 
have appeared to a reasonable person in the position of the arresting officer—seeing 
3 
what he saw, hearing what he heard/7 Mahoney v. Kesery, 976 F.2d 1054,1057 (7th 
Cir. 1992). 
In claiming that Officers Larsen and Swensen had time to procure a warrant, 
defendant views the facts as an omniscient observer rather then as one of the 
officers. She argues that the delay created by Officer Swensen going to the wrong 
hospital and then waiting for the blood technician to arrive created a window for 
officers to seek a warrant. See Supp. Br. Resp't at 12-13. But his claim demonstrates 
only that, in hindsight, the officers might have had time to obtain a warrant—it does 
not demonstrate that, at the time of the search, the officers knew that they had time 
to obtain a warrant. And it certainly does not demonstrate that the officers acted 
unreasonably—the Fourth Amendment standard—in not obtaining a warrant. 
To the contrary, Officers Swensen and Larsen could not have anticipated the 
delays that defendant claims gave them time to seek a warrant. Officer Swensen did 
not realize he was at the wrong hospital until he got to the University of Utah 
Hospital and spoke to emergency personnel (R. 560:19-20). There is also no 
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evidence that Officer Swensen knew that he would have to wait twenty-five minutes 
for a blood technician to arrive.1 
In fact, Officers Swensen and Larsen had no reason to believe they needed a 
warrant because defendant impliedly consented to a blood draw. Under Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-6-44.10(l)(a) (2004), anyone driving a car in Utah is considered to have 
consented to have their blood drawn if an officer has probable cause to think the 
person was driving drunk.2 If the person is unconscious or otherwise incapable of 
refusing the test, as happens sometimes in car accidents, he or she is considered "to 
not have withdrawn the consent. . . and the test or tests may be administered/7 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44.10(3). Because the law deems all drivers to have 
consented to a blood test if officers have probable cause, a warrant is unnecessary. 
It is only when the driver refuses consent that a warrant becomes necessary. Thus, 
1
 Defendant claims that Officer Larsen should have gotten a warrant because 
he "knew it would take time for the dispatched officer and the blood draw 
technician to travel to the hospital, locate the driver of the vehicle, and prepare for 
the blood draw." Supp. Br. Resp't at 11. In support of this claim, defendant cites 
generally to Officer Larsen's entire direct and cross examination at the suppression 
hearing. See id. (citing R. 560:12-17). Nothing in Officer Larsen's testimony suggests 
that he knew that the time for Officer Swensen and the blood draw technician to 
travel to the hospital would be long enough to allow him to obtain a warrant. 
2
 The Legislature recently amended and recodified the traffic code, including 
the implied consent law. See 2005 Utah Laws 68. The amendment changed the 
structure and location of the implied consent law, but the substance is the same. 
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until Officer Swensen found defendant at the hospital, he and Officer Larsen had no 
reason to get a warrant and should not reasonably be expected to seek one.3 
Additionally, as explained in point B of this reply, the twenty-five minutes 
that Officer Swensen waited for the blood technician is generally insufficient to 
obtain even a telephonic warrant. See United States v. Tarazon, 989 R2d 1045,1050 
(9th Cir. 1993) (holding that government need not put on evidence of time needed to 
obtain telephonic warrant because thirty minutes available to officers was clearly 
insufficient to obtain a telephonic warrant); United States c. Cuaron, 700 R2d 582,590 
n.6 (10th 1983) ("We do not hold that 30 minutes is never sufficient time to obtain a 
telephone warrant; we hold only that 30 minutes was inadequate time to obtain and 
serve a warrant under these circumstances'7). 
The unforeseeability of the delays and the immediacy of the exigency renders 
the officer's actions reasonable in this case. It also distinguishes this case from cases 
defendant cites in support of his claim that the delays negated the exigency. See 
Supp. Br. Resp't at 5-7. For example, in United States v. Vatino, the court held that no 
exigency justified a warrantless intrusion into a home to arrest Patino and her co-
defendant. See 830 R2d 1413,1416 (7th Cir. 1987). The court noted that agents had 
3
 While Officer Swensen did not ask for consent (R. 560:54-55), it is not clear 
from the record whether defendant refused consent. This appeal has proceeded, 
however, on the assumption that defendant refused. See Br. Aplt. at 15. 
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thirty minutes while waiting for backup to obtain a telephonic warrant and that if 
the warrant took longer, the agents could have "discreetly watched the exits while 
they awaited the telephonic search warrant/7 Id. Arguably, in fact, there was never 
an exigency in Patino because there was no immediate need to arrest Patino or her 
co-defendant. The agents could have simply watched the outside of the home to 
prevent Patino's escape while they waited for a warrant. 
Likewise, in United States v. Diaz, agents knew that Diaz, a drug dealer, was 
expecting an undercover agent to be gone for at least thirty minutes during a drug 
transaction at a hotel. See 814 F.2d 454,457-59 (7th Cir. 1987). They did not use that 
time to seek a warrant, but instead immediately entered the hotel room and arrested 
Diaz. Id. at 457. Diaz presented evidence at the suppression hearing that "a 
magistrate was on call that day, and that a telephonic warrant could therefore have 
been obtained." Id. The court thus held that because agents knew they had time to 
obtain a telephonic warrant and likely could have, no exigency existed. Id. at 458-
59. 
Unlike Patino and Diaz, officers in the instant case had no expectation of any 
delay in performing the search. They knew only that an immediate blood test was 
necessary and that they could perform the test with only a short delay to drive to 
the hospital. 
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Further, unlike the drug sting in Diaz or the home arrest in Patino, defendant's 
drunk driving accident was an unexpected event. Officers Larsen and Swensen did 
not have the benefit of preparation, control over the location or time of the accident, 
or reconnaissance by informants or undercover agents. By the time Officer Larsen 
had probable cause to draw defendant's blood, the accident had occurred and 
defendant had been carted off to a hospital. It is unreasonable to expect him to be 
able to obtain a warrant with the same ease and rapidity as the agents in Diaz and 
Patino. 
B. DEFENDANT MISCHARACTERIZES THE REQUIREMENTS OF 
A TELEPHONIC WARRANT. 
In asserting that, in hindsight, officers had time to obtain a warrant, defendant 
claims that Officer Swensen "could have called for a warrant from the moment he 
was dispatched to witness the blood draw." Supp. Br. Pet. at 12. She further argues 
that Swensen "could have called while he was driving to the hospital, especially 
considering the additional time he took driving to the wrong hospital." Id. 
Defendant's claim mischaracterizes the requirements for obtaining a telephonic 
warrant. 
A telephonic warrant is more than a simple phone call. In 2001, when 
defendant's blood was drawn, telephonic warrants were governed by Utah Code 
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Ann. § 77-23-204.4 That section permitted a magistrate to issue a warrant "upon 
sworn oral testimony of a person who is not in the physical presence of the 
magistrate." Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-204(2) (2004). In other words, it allowed an 
officer to communicate the basis for probable cause by telephone rather than in 
person. But section 77-23-204 still required the officer to have a physical warrant. It 
required the officer to "read to [the magistrate] verbatim the contents of the 
warrant." Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-204(2)(a). The magistrate could then "direct that 
specific modifications be made in the warrant," and direct the officer "to sign the 
magistrate's name on the warrant." Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-204(2)(a). Thus a 
telephonic warrant still required the officer to prepare a written warrant that he 
could read to the magistrate, sign, and present to the suspect when the search was 
performed. In reality, the only benefit of a telephonic warrant is that the officer does 
not need to drive to the courthouse. 
While it is not clear in this case how long it would have taken to get a 
warrant, telephonic or otherwise, such a showing is unnecessary when the exigency 
is immediate. "The record need not disclose such specific proof, however, where 
4
 In the 2005 legislative session, the legislature repealed section 77-23-204 in 
favor of the procedures that were adopted by this Court in rule 40, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. See 2005 Utah Laws 24. While the text of rule 40 differs from 
section 77-23-204, the requirements for obtaining a warrant are essentially the same. 
Compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-23-204 (2004) with Utah R. Crim. P. 40. 
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the exigencies in a particular case are so imperative that recourse to even a 
telephone warrant was unavailable/7 United States v. Berick, 710 R2d 1035,1038-39 
(5th Cir. 1983); see also Tarazon, 989 F.2d at 1050 (holding that thirty minute delay in 
search was clearly insufficient to obtain a telephonic warrant, so State had no duty 
to present evidence of time to get a warrant); Cuaron, 700 F.2d at 589 (holding that 
trial court must consider availability of telephonic warrant "unless the critical 
nature of the circumstances clearly prevented the effective use of any warrant/7). 
In the instant case, the exigency was immediate. See Supp. Br. Pet. at 8-9. 
Moreover, it would be absurd to expect Officer Swenson to call for a telephonic 
warrant while he was driving to the hospital. Like obtaining a traditional warrant, a 
telephonic warrant would have required Officers Swensen or Larsen to stop their 
investigation, find a computer or typewriter to prepare the warrant, type the 
warrant, locate a magistrate, and then read it verbatim over the phone. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-23-204(2). Given that defendant's body was destroying critical 
evidence of her intoxication, the officers reasonably believed that the delay 
necessary to obtain a warrant, telephonic or otherwise, threatened the destruction of 
evidence. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons and those stated in the previous briefs, the State 
respectfully requests the Court to reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Respectfully submitted October 23,2006. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
MATTHEW D. BATES 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Petitioner 
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